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The Basel II committee set up directives encouraging banks to use internal scores in order to 
assess the risk of their customers. This new form of information competes with the existing 
ones. SMEs are most concerned by these new stakes, due to the lack of transparency.  
The aim of this paper is to understand the determinants of the choice between substitution and 
complementarity between the two types of information: “soft” and “hard”, to test a potential 
effect of this choice on the banking performance and to describe which variables are involved 
in the decision-making process.  
The originality of this work is to try to quantify the information costs and to use it as a 
variable which is affecting the adopted choice. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
The most known activity of the bank is collecting funds from depositaries and allotting credits 
to borrowers. This financial intermediation contains several risks which are primarily related 
to not respecting the engagements or the insolvency of borrowers. To face these risks, banks 
set up and developed tools to evaluate, to measure and to control them. 
 
The upheavals of the banking sector which result from the bankruptcies of banks, such us the 
incident of the German bank: “Herstott”, which generated domino effect in this sector and 
leaded to a serious financial crisis. This situation encouraged the “group of ten’s” central 
banks governors to set up an institution of control in order to stimulate the co-operation and to 
promote the international harmonization of banking prudential monitoring: the committee of 
Basle.  In  spite  of  the  fact  that  this  institution  does  not  have  any  authority  and  that  its 
conclusions do not have the force of law, its directives widely affected the banking activity.  
The most famous achievements of the Committee are the first and the second agreement of 
Basle  (Basle  I  &  Basle  II),  which  propose  the  unification  of  risk  management  and  the 
implementation of modelling processes.  
 
This modelling evokes necessarily the treatment of “hard” information in opposition to those 
already used and which are based on the “soft” information. Thus, in order to rigorously 
respect the directives of Basle, researchers are divided into two groups: the first workshop 
supported the substitution of “soft” information by “hard” information, but, the second one 
stand up for the complementarity between the two types of information.  
Indeed, in the first case, banks can replace the actual decision process by another one which is 
based exclusively on  financial and accounting data. This is argued not only  by the strict 
standardization of risk measurements, but also by the unification of the evaluation methods.  
Alternatively, the complementarities between the two types of information can be choose in 
order to take profit from “soft” information advantages in the same time of integrating the 
new procedures.  
The principal question is to know what the variables that determine the adopted banks choice 
are. 
The attributed scores are calculated within banks according to characteristics and specificities 
suitable for each one of them. This is why a differential exists between the decision-making 








































1  3 
These changes are not assigned to all borrowers at the same degree: SMEs remain the most 
vulnerable  customers.  In  fact,  the  access  of  this  segment  of  customers  to  the  credit  is 
increasingly  restrictive  whereas  the  request  is rising.  This  is  the  result  of  the fact  that  a 
personalized  treatment must  be implemented to respond to their informational  characters: 
their bad financial data quality and their opacity. 
Our work will be particularly focussed on this segment of customers which constitute the 
major issues of the Basle Committee directives application. 
 
The great differences between banks prevent the generalization of the Basle II directives. 
Each bank characteristics and each country banking system constitute an important constraint 
in the choice of adequate information for the treatment of the loan request.  
The  differential  noted  in  the  loan  demand  treatment  can  lead  us  to  think  that  these 
informational and functional level transformations do not remain without consequences on the 
banks performance, but what about the significativity of these consequences? 
 
To answer these two questions, it will be necessary to divide this paper into three parts.  
In the first one, we will present an empirical measurement of the statistical significativity of 
the  variables  which  explain  the  banks  choices  concerning  the  information  treatment: 
substitution or complementarity. In the second part, we will test the significativity of the 
impact of this choice on banks performance and in the third part we will give a statistical 
description of the decision-making process of the loan officer. This last part will show the 
importance of the loan technology adequacy with the characteristics of credit scheme. 
 
The plan of this study will be as follows. The first section will present the review of the 
literature and the various assumptions, the second section will give a description of the data 
and variables, the third section will present methodology and the results of the regressions, 
finally the last section will conclude my work. 
2.  Theories and assumptions 
 
The excessive risk taking, adopted by the financial institutions, threatens the financial system 
and amplifies its weakness. In order to predict and reduce this threat, the Basle committee 
recommended the harmonization of the measurement models by imposing at banks the use of 
the internal scores, which are essentially based on “hard” information and consequently allow 
a best credits monitoring. 
The installation of the reliable control systems leading to standardization of the methods of 
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of  these  systems  has  an  important  constraint.  In  fact,  differences  between  international 
financial  systems  and  the  bank’s  roles  amplify  the  difficulties  to  extend  this  system  of 
control. Moreover,  not  only  the  divergence  between  banks affects  the choice  of adequate 
information but also their compatibility with the two types of information do.  
 
2.1.  “Soft” information vs “hard” information  
 
“Soft”  information  is  qualitative  data,  reduced  to  a  written  text  which  represents  the 
judgments and the opinions of the person who collected it. This information is collected and 
used by the same person who is supposed having tight and direct relationship with SMEs. 
This relationship must be established with the low hierarchical levels of the bank. 
“Hard” information is a quantitative data, impersonal and independent of the context of its 
collect. It presents neither a judgment, nor an opinion, but only an interpretation done by the 
officer who collects it. He hasn’t any power of decision and any latitude, during the use of 
this type of information: he becomes a simple reporter (Stein, 2002). “Hard” information is 
based on relatively objective criteria, like the financial ratios and the indices of profitability. It 
must have a single interpretation by all agents of all hierarchical levels of the bank. This 
impersonal information is opposed to “soft” information. 
The  fundamental  difference  between  these  two  types  of  information  will  generate  an 
important divergence on their roles in the decision process and credit monitoring.  
Costs generated by each type of information are the main issue of their installation. Costs of 
information consist on research, verification and control costs (Godlewski, 2004). But we can 
suppose that they can include the collection, treatment and storage costs.  
 
Stein  (2002) supposes that  the  loan  officers, during  the  use of “hard”  information in the 
decision  process,  are  transformed  into  simple  reporters.  Indeed,  the  collection  and  the 
treatment of “hard” information do not require important qualifications, contrary to “soft” 
information which requires agents highly qualified. The necessary qualifications, needed for 
the “soft” information analysis, force banks to recruit agents more experienced and more 
competent  and  to  pay  high  wages.  By  adopting  “hard”  information,  banks  may  reduce 
personal payment. As a matter of fact, the centralization of the decision, resulting from the 
use  of  “hard”  information,  improve  a  concentration  of  competences  on  high  hierarchical 
levels  within  which  decision  are  taken  and  consequently  a  less  of  qualifications  on  low 
hierarchical levels.  Still, this centralization requires a better transmission of information. 
“Hard” information is characterized by its easy transmission and storage; this requires only 
low costs computer tools. The quality of these supports and their great life length contributed 
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Contrary to the latter, the “soft” information is a personal judgment and a subjective opinion 
of  the  person  who  collects  and  treats  it.  This  loan  officer  will  generate  additional  costs 
affecting the bank profitability. According to, Berger, Frame & Miller (2005) and Berger & 
Deyoung (2000), scores that are essentially based on “hard” information, allow the reduction 
of the loan officer control costs and more generally the reduction of governance costs.  
This  costs  decrease  enables  banks  to  offer  marginal  credit  which  generated  not  enough 
interests to cover the high “soft” information treatment expenses. The “hard” information 
eliminates the effect of distance as well as the associated availability and control difficulties. 
(Deyoung & Al, 2008). 
 
Loans Technologies represent the system set up by banks to study the requests of credits. 
According to Udell (2008), technologies of loan are dependant on the nature of information 
used. There exist two big classes of technologies, according to the nature of information used: 
the  relationship  Bank-SMEs  based  on  “soft”  information  and  the  technologies  based  on 
transactions using “hard” information. (Stein 2002, Stick Goldberg & White 2004, Frame & 
Al, 2001, Berger & Al 2005).  
In theory, the exploitation of the relationship Bank-SMEs proved the best technology of loan. 
It minimizes the problems of information asymmetry but, it presents major difficulties for the 
loan officer to re-transcribe his opinion and his judgment and to extract reliable information 
for the decision.  
For SMEs, banks are always the most important source of finance (Berger & Udell, 1996). 
The optimal management of the loan request, on this segment of customers, depends crucially 
on the adaptation of the technology of loan to the specific requirements of this category of 
firms. SMEs privilege the durable relationship with their banks in order to balance out their 
opacity. Relationship Bank-SMEs is still associated with a decision process different from 
that based on “hard” information. (Berger & Udell, 2002).  
 
2.1.1.  Relationship Bank-SMEs and the reduce of information asymmetry problems   
 
Berger & Udell (2002) were interested in problems of agency. They qualify the bank as chain 
of  relationships  of  agency  between  borrowers,  credit  officers,  directors,  shareholders, 
depositaries and government regulators.  
In this chain, we will be interested particularly in the links connecting borrowers to credit 
officers, at first, and credit officers to directors, at second.  
The credit officer is all the time trying to avoid two problems that were presented for the first 
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remunerate  the  risk  taken  by  the  bank:  it  is  the  adverse  selection,  or  not  react  vis-à-vis 
embezzlement for another project, it is the hazard moral (Berger & Udell, 2002). 
In this first relationship of agency, the nature of information plays a crucial role in the credit 
control. The collected “soft” information throughout the time  is  more  complete so it can 
reduce the risk of information asymmetry. Stick (1998) confirms this idea by specifying that 
SMEs feel in a friendly relationship with banks, maintaining a lending relationship based on 
“soft” information. The lending relationship is one of the most effective means to reduce the 
problem  of  information  and  is  still  an  important  mean  to  determine  the  terms  of  credit 
contract (Berger & Udell, 2002). Godbillon-Camus & Godlewski (2006) assure that “soft” 
information reduces the problems of hazard moral and adverse selection by decreasing the 
problems of discretion. Contrary to “hard” information which refers to mathematical data and 
financial ratios and which are based primarily on financial documents presented by SMEs. 
However, those can rig the results and doctor the accounts, hide reality, in order to obtain a 
credit.   
 
“Soft” information is more adequate to resolve the informational problems between lenders 
and borrowers. But the accumulation of this type of information can give more liberty to 
credit officer and generate new problems of agency tied to the control of the officer scope 
during the granting of the credit. The asymmetry of information between the credit officers 
and  their  superiors  generates  problems  of  confidence  and  difficulties  to  optimize  funds 
allocation. The accumulation of “soft” information can harm the control done by the directors. 
  
The short-term vision of the credit officers can also generate agency problems (Berger & 
Udell, 2002). Indeed, the system of remuneration of these agents which is indexed on the 
generated profits of the granted credits, privileges offering credit at court term and a personal 
relationship or a will to dissimulate realities supporting the retention of information. 
Within a small commune, the proximity and its positioning in the local economic life lead the 
credit officers to enrich, to improve and to personalize the relationship with the firm. This 
complex interrelationship leads to a climate of solidarity and unity between all of the different 
actors. The delimitation between personal and professional relationship push the credit officer 
to feel to belong to this community, and he feels an attachment or reciprocity towards the 
manager of the firm. Berger & Udell (2002) argue this idea by the study of Uzzi & Gillespie 
(1999) in which they used a sociological paradigm to frame the relationship in the terms of 
social attachment towards the owner of the firm. Furthermore, Godlewski (2004) showed the 
benefit of decision decentralization and the information treatment using the study of Liberti 
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effort of the loan officer. They used the theoretical framework of Aghion & Tirole (1997) to 
study  foreign  banks  in  Argentina.  Their  results  showed  that  officers  who  receive  more 
authority use more efficiently their “soft” information. Indeed, credit officer holding a higher 
decisional power can be emphasized and feels more responsible of his decisions. He tries to 
always take the best decision because he feels the only responsible in front of his superiors. 
Nevertheless, he will not feel responsible for these decisions in case of not being the maker of 
them. If he feels like a simple reporter who collects information and transmits them to his 
directors who make the decision, he’ll not provide the same effort nor will he have the same 
motivation. 
 
Berger  &  Udell  (2002)  support  this  close  relationship  between  the  nature  of 
information and control. They specify that each technology of loan consists of a combination 
between the primary information source, mechanisms and procedures of monitoring. For this 
reason the procedure of decision making defers along different banks and also along different 
countries. The use of “soft” information requires a treatment of personalized credit and it is 
based on proximity to the firm decision maker.  
Bankers  are  social  members,  so  they  are  sensitive  to  their  environment  and  made 
change their decisions and behaviours according to the circumstances. An economic recession 
or a financial crisis can influence the agent judgment. “Soft” information is collected over one 
rather  long  period  and  consequently  it  is  possible  to  differentiate  between  the  borrower 
failures and the economic crises and their effects on his activity. Information that is collected 
from customers, suppliers and the owner of the firm can concern the general environment in 
which the firm operates (Berger & Udell, 2002). The check and the quality control of the very 
subjective  “soft”  information  remain  difficult  to  realize.  On  contrary,  “hard”  information 
cannot integrate economic factors and specificities of its collect. “Hard” information depends 
neither  to  the  context  nor  to  the  geographical  and  temporal  limits  of  the  collection 
(Godlewski, 2004).  
 
The  role  of  the  loan  officer  appears  simple  but  information  collect  is  not  monotonous 
throughout the period. The officer must provide extra efforts to be able to take account of the 
changes which affect the determinants of the relationship. There are three determinants of the 
relationship between the bank and the borrower: characteristics of the bank, characteristics of 
the borrower and characteristics of the market. 
We  can  find  other  variables  influencing  the  relationship  and  not  depending  on  these 
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quality of collected information, the services offered to the customer and the cost generated 
by the production of information. 
 
The information which is collected during the credit relationship concerns the firm, its owner 
and the global economic environment in which she exerts. The strength of this relationship 
affects costs and availability of credits and; it is measured by the LENGTH and the total lent 
amount, (Berger & Udell, 2002). Udell (2008) gave other indices to measure the strength of 
the relationship: his breadth and the inverse of the number of banks. 
 
The length of the relationship is regarded as one of the most important indicators of the force 
of the relationship and it can affect the prices of the credits and their availability. Indeed, 
relationship length variation affects interest rate, the availability and even the terms of credit. 
The variation of the prices along the time is still an unsolved subject of discussion. At first, 
we can envisage a fall of the prices in time, by the fact that the quantity of information 
collected over the period is accrued and thus gives a better visibility of the firm that will profit 
from more interesting prices compared to other firms. Secondly, we can support the idea of 
Elsas (2005) which states that information collection is not monotonous; the flow of private 
information collected from relationship can be reduced or give negative signs, it can discredit 
preceding information, which generates a rising of prices instead of a decreasing of them. 
 
The measurement of the relationship breadth is based primarily on the amounts granted by the 
bank to its customer. A bank can grant important sums to only one firm which maintains a 
strong  relationship  with  the  bank.  The  amounts  granted  by  the  bank  reassure  the  other 
financial institutions. The relationship with the bank is a certificate for the good health of the 
firm.  
 
If the bank offers services to its customers, apart credit, the volume of these services can 
indicate the relationship strength. Indeed, one bank offering several services to a firm has 
more contact with this one. The services offered by the bank and touching the financial aspect 
give him an excellent visibility on the financial “health” of the firm. 
 
The bank can change behaviour between one customer and the others according to the history 
of  its  relationship  and  can  impose  clauses  or  terms  of  contracts  more  or  less  restrictive 
according to the customer. The importance of this clauses and terms can explain the strength 
of the relationship and the power of the bank in it. The bank misusing of power of negotiation 
can go until a strategy of “holding” by which it dominates SMEs and imposes its conditions 
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and generates more discretion and opacity, and consequently, the bank loses its advantage 
compared to other establishments
1. Cole (1998) shows that banks don’t privilege offering 
credit to the firms having multiple funding sources because of the difficulties to obtain private 
information. Foglia, Laviola & Maruello (1998) approve again this idea by noting that the 
relationship  with  only  one  bank  gives  an  atmosphere  of  confidence  and  consolidates  the 
relationship in time. 
 
SMEs suffer from a shortage of financing that could be generated mainly by their asymmetry 
of information. During their first business year, they use internal sources of financing. The 
relationship between banks and firms can play a key part in the resolution of the problems of 
information asymmetry and soften the imperfections of the financial market, (Berger & al, 
2008). Indeed this relationship gives the possibility to banks to intervene in the management 
of their customers at the time of a crisis and/or a risk of insolvency.  
We should specify that there exist two situations distinct from loan demand. 
A first loan application:  
- When the request is made, the bank does not have an advantage compared to the other 
financial institutions, (Lummer & Mc Connel, 1989; Elyasiani & Goldberg, 2004). These last 
authors add that it is only after a period of time that banks produces information and profits 
from the relationship. They stress on the time, by specifying that the length of relationship has 
positive effects on its’ advantages. 
A request following an existing relationship: 
- Contrary to the first situation, the bank exploits this proximity to optimize its decisions and 
to avoid any kind of informational deformation. Elyasiani & Goldberg (2004) as Boot (2000) 
support the idea that the relationship between the lender and the borrower can produce an 
important informational input helping the lender  to take  the decision of credit  supply, to 
evaluate borrower and to determine credit specificities and terms. 
 
HYP 1: The nature of used information defers between a first loan request and a 
“post relationship” request. 
 
We supposed that historically, the bank must produce information beyond public information 
because it is crucial for the decision of credit and stay an important indicator of the customer 
solvency. The bank profits from its proximity relationship with SMEs to solve the problem of 
asymmetry of information. Compared to the other financial institutions, it can be engaged in 
specific contracts releasing advantages. Banks having a considerable weight on the market 
                                                









































1  10 
can be allowed to choose good borrowers, (Petersen & Rajan, 1995). Good borrowers are the 
least risky and thus most resistant in front of the environment changes. The advantage of 
choosing good borrowers or less risky allows to solve the problem of informational opacity 
(Cole, 1998).  
SMEs  feel  financial  security  in  a  relationship  with  the  small  banks  which  have  a  low 
organizational hierarchy. They profit from a relationship and more agents availability for a 
personalized monitoring of their request. SMEs are more transparent with their bank and 
situation allows an increase of information flows. It seems obvious that more information 
could generate less ambiguity. This organization supports a greater transparency and a better 
transmission of information.  
The relationship is one of the most effective means to reduce the asymmetry of information. It 
affects the decision and determines the terms of credit (Berger, 2002). Banks are not satisfied 
any more by any kind of information but they require relevant information for decision and to 
fix terms of credit. The credit terms vary with the mass of “soft” information. The absence of 
exact information pushes the banks to adopt an adverse selection of SMEs, (Godbillon-Camus 
& Godlewski, 2006). 
 
Elements that can change the relationship are, chiefly: technological development, the change 
of regulations, the competition conditions and the macroeconomics, (Berger & Udell, 2002). 
Thus,  all  these  variables  can  influence  the  relationship  existing  between  banks  and  their 
borrowers and can push the former to substitute this relationship by other technologies more 
adapted to new requirements. 
 
HYP 2: The contact between the credit officer and SMEs promote the information 
“soft” transfer. 
2.1.2.  The technology of loan based on a transaction.  
 
According to Berger & Al (2005), technologies for the credit decision-making are essentially 
based on financial and assets statements, ratings or the personal relationship
2. Technologies of 
transaction are based on “hard” information. They vary according to the information sources, 
firm characteristics, the regulation changes and the nature of the used data. 
 
The credit decision, which is based on the financial statements, requires them to be reliable 
(Berger & Udell, 1998). This reliability is generally related to the transparency of the firm. 
The technology of loan based on the data of the financial statements is more adapted for the 
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relatively transparent firms (Berger & Udell, 2002). This transparency is positively related to 
the firm size. A large company must hold correct financial statements. This transparency is 
the  answer  to  the  need  for  transmission  of  relevant  information  to  the  bank.  Thus  the 
technology of credit decision based on the financial statements is destined especially for the 
big firms characterized by the rigor of their financial data. 
 
The  assets  statements  give  a  more  precise  idea  on  the  value  of  the  guarantees  and  the 
mortgages which a firm can present for a credit. The technology which is based on the assets 
statement  evokes  the  problem  of  the  mortgage  evaluation,  because  this  evaluation  is 
subjective. The credit officer who works within the bank can estimate a wrong value of the 
mortgages. To avoid this problem, banks are interested especially in new acquisitions or they 
will have recourse to experts who will determine with exactitude the value of the mortgage. 
As firms become bigger and older as its banking financial access is easy. This idea is based on 
the fact that older and larger firms have more assets to present like guarantee and to reduce 
informational opacity (Vos & Al, 2007). But, Udell (2008) is opposed to this idea and he 
specifies  that  the  technology  based  on  the  assets  is  mainly  subscribed  on  the  basis  of 
mortgage and thus the general opacity of the firm is relatively inconsistent. 
 
Use of scores is limited to the mature economies, in which the borrower’s databases and the 
rating  offices  are  developed,  (Udell,  2008).  The  recourse  to  scores  is  explained  by  a 
development of amount and number of credit (Berger, Frame & Miller 2005 and Cater & Mc 
Nulty 2005). The credit officer does not manage any more the big number of the loan requests 
by collecting and treating the “soft” information but, in place, he have recourse to scores to 
benefit from the existing financial information: easy to treat and control. The use of the scores 
for SMEs credits is one of the most important innovations in the financial services, (Berger & 
Al, 2001).  
We can find two kinds of scores: internal scores and external scores. The internal scores are 
calculated by the bank, whereas the external scores are obtained from the rating offices or 
other financial institutions. Banks which use the scores are divided into two parts according to 
the type of the used scores. Those using the external scores adhere to “rules” whereas those 
which develop their internal scores adhere to “discretion” (Berger, Frame & Miller, 2005).  
Banks which use the external scores try to be aligned to other establishments and do not 
benefit from the flexibility of the internal scores. They seek using the same public information 
and the same rules of the market. These banks are not interested by the specificities of their 
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adapted  to  bank  characteristics  and  borrowers  specificities.  All  collected  information  and 
scores are confidential and stay the exclusive property of the bank. 
The use of the scores can be accompanied by another detailed study relating to the borrower if 
he obtains a score near to the threshold value (Godlowski, 2004). The use of the scores does 
not prove that the bank has best valorisations or the most exact information about borrowers 
and does not guarantee that the bank took the good decision but that it reduces its’ costs, 
accelerates and improves the decision making (Deyoung, Lennon & Nigro, 2008). The market 
requires more reactivity, so banks must reduce the response time to the loan request and 
optimize their treatment. To answer this time constraint the bankers adopt information that is 
easier to collect and to treat. 
 
HYP 3: the time constraint of the request treatment favours the use of only “hard” 
information. 
 
External scores are generally calculated in rating offices and thereafter sold to the banks. The 
low costs of these scores can be the key motivation for their adoption and their use to decide 
of the credit supply (Berger & Frame 2005). The use of these scores generates a greater 
competitiveness on the banking market. The scores used by banks are considered as public 
data accessible by everyone. The external scores are standardized and do not privilege the 
banks which use them. The slicing character of the use of scores leads to rigidity in making 
decisions and aggravates the problem of firm opacity (Berger & Frame 2005).  
 
The use of the internal scores exists since a long time yet but the committee of Basle 
directives  contributed  to  their  generalization.  The  committee  of  Basle  incited  banks  to 
calculate the internal scores specific to their characteristics. The processes, which allow banks 
to calculate internal scores, can solve the problem of the exaggeration of risk taking but they 
can create at the same time a new problem of agency (Berger & Udell 2002). In fact, the 
internal scores generated new conflicts between banks and the banking market supervisors. 
Regulators, who are charged  to monitor  banking  intermediation on the credit  market and 
applying the Basle committee directives, cannot determine all specificities of banks and are 
unable to control their risk taking (Fees & Hege 2004). 
 
Up to now, banks stay rigid in the studies of the requests of credit. Only the informational 
character is important, the size of the credit was neglected. Godlewski (2004) stipulated that 
credit problems come from the ex ante information imperfection regarding the risk of failure 
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as appealing by Lobez (1988) because it is founded on non homogeneity of the credit. The 
decomposition of the credit leads us to wonder if their size influences the decision of supply.  
The integration of the influence of the credit amount in decision making is a result of the 
enforcement of the Basle agreements. Banks must fix the capital to be lent at the beginning of 
every year to preserve the regulation ratios. The application of models based on the scores 
reduces the quality of collected information. Large credits tend to be more exacting in terms 
of information because they weigh heavier on the risk.  
 
Information treatment cost in decision making which can be take into account by the banks; 
the more important the amount of credit is, the less significant the costs of information are, 
which supports thorough searches for information. Lobez (1988) gives the following example: 
lending hundred Euros thousand times does not generate the same costs for the bank as to 
lend thousand Euros hundred times. Furthermore, banks support the use of less expensive 
information if they judge that the requested credit amounts are not important. Berger & Frame 
(2005) specify that the growth, of the availability of credits for SMEs, is rather due to the 
reduction in the costs of implementation of scores that reduction in opacity. Small credits tend 
to  have  their  prices  being  more  raised  than  largest  in  order  to  cover  the  costs  of  the 
information treatment.  
 
HYP 4: The average credit amount is positively correlated with the use of “hard” 
information. 
 
2.2.  The nature of information and bank characteristics  
 
Banking sector was divided into two main categories: small banks and large banks
3. The 
small banks have recourse to “soft” information whereas large banks use “hard” information 
(Berger & Al 1998, Berger & Al 2002, Stick & Al 2004, Petersen 2004, Petersen & Rajan, 
2002 and Stein 2002). The specialization of the small banks in “soft” information and the 
large ones in “hard” information answers to the specific needs of each one. The large banks 
tend  to  standardize  their  procedures  and  to  decentralize  their  decisions,  thus,  they  need 
information easy to verify and control.  
Large  banks  are  better  in  the  markets  characterized  by  standardized  credit  and  not 
personalized services (Carter & Mc Nulty 2005). Standardized products do require neither a 
particular  treatment  nor  a  specific  collection  of  information.  “Hard”  information  can  be 
sufficient for such technology of loan. By using this category of information, large banks 
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penalize small borrowers, who privilege a durable relationship for the access to the credit. 
Large banks tend to reduce their credits to SMEs and to use the financial ratios more than the 
information  emitted  during  the  established  relationship  (Berger  &  Udell  2002).  Indeed, 
according to Berger, Frame & Miller, (2005) the bank size is negatively correlated with the 
volume of the credits devoted to SMEs.  
Large  banks  are  more  competitive  than  small  ones  in  the  supply  of  credits  to  distant 
customers. Small banks are adapted to maintain a durable relationship with these customers 
(Deyoung, Lenon & Nigro 2008 and Berger & Al 2005). This durable relationship involves 
the collection of “soft” information and depends especially on competences of small banks 
which benefit from this situation of proximity by positioning on niches of customers forsaken 
by largest. By using “soft” information, small banks are more competitive than large ones in 
the supply of small credits (Carter & Mc Nulty 2005, Berger & Al 2002). The need for a 
durable and personalized relationship with SMEs can ensure the survival of the small banks 
community, (Udell 2008, Deyoung, Hunter & Udell 2004). 
 
HYP 5: Large banks are encouraged by their size to adopt “hard” information. 
 
The  organisational  structure  is  generally  related  to  the  size  of  the  bank  whereas  the 
organisational complexity can be observed in a small bank and/or not to in large ones. Banks 
can adopt behaviours which do not reflect their sizes. A small bank which belongs to “hold 
up” cannot behave like such and must follow the instructions of this dominating firm (Keeton, 
1995; Carter & Mc Nulty 2005).  
Organisational complexity is of two types: horizontal complexity related to the diversity of 
bank  functions  and  vertical  complexity  related  to  the  number  of  the  hierarchical  levels 
(Frame,  Srinivasan  &  Woosley  2001).  Berger  &  Frame  (2005)  evoke  the  idea  that  the 
organisational  structure of  the  bank  plays  an  important  role  in  the  choice  of information 
needed for making decisions: it is preferable for the banks which have few charters and more 
branches of activity to adopt the scores based mainly on “hard” information. These authors 
base their argument on other studies such as Frame, Srinivisan & woosley (2001) and of 
Akhavian, Frame & White (2005). The banks’ complex organization encourages them to use 
information easy to transmit and to verify during time and/or between various agents. 
Small  banks  that  with  restricted  hierarchical  levels  use  “soft”  information  to  face  the 
information asymmetry problems (Berger & Udell 2002). The esteem and gratitude given to 
the work of the credit officer by the manager of the decentralized institutions optimize the 
information use (Liberti 2004). The transmission and the reliability of “soft” information are 
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HYP 6: Banks which decentralize the decision of credit use “soft” information. 
 
During the treatment of credit request, banks can be devoted to two variables: the cost 
and the quality of treated information. Banks do not adopt the same strategic choice and do 
not make the same arbitration between the cost and the quality of information. Berger, Frame 
& Miller (2005) support the idea that the scores are adopted to minimize the costs or to 
increase the precision
4. They add that we can distinguish two types of banks: those using the 
external scores to decide and those using them like a complement with technology in place to 
improve the precision of decision. 
 
Banks that are seeking to minimize the costs of collection and of treatment of information 
necessary to the credit decision adopt “hard” information. Deyoung, Lennon & Nigro (2008) 
present  two  manners  of  reducing  the  costs  during  the  use  of  “hard”  information.  The 
reduction can be the result of its low costs of treatment in opposition to “soft” information or 
the  neutralization  of  the  effect  of  distances,  which  follows  from  the  treatment  of  “hard” 
information  
 
The minimization of costs can be the motivation of the adoption of scores and their use for the 
credit  decision-making  but  it  can  also  aggravate  firm  opacity  problems  and  the  contract 
clauses (Berger & Frame 2005).  
 
HYP 7: the cost of collection, treatment and storage of information explains the 
nature of information used; the high cost explains the use of “soft” information. 
 
“Hard”  Information  is  certainly  less  expensive  but  it  is  based  mainly  on  financial  and 
accounting data. But “soft” information is more complete and better reflects the real situation 
of the firm. It integrates general data on the leader, economic environment and on various 
variables  affecting  the  firm  activity:  thus,  it’s  richer  than  “hard”  information.  The 
complementarity between these two types of information makes it possible to the bank to 
make a more relevant decision. By doing this way, they minimize losses related to the bad 
attribution of the credits. After having eliminated bad borrowers, banks will be able to reduce 
the provisions for loan losses and to benefit from a less risky situation. The motivation of few 
banks is to improve the precision of the decision, which leads as the importance of combined 
use of “hard” information and “soft” information. This idea was treated in several studies 
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such  as  Deyoung,  Lenon  &  Nigro  (2008),  Frame,  Srinivasan  &  Woosley  (1998)  and 
Akhavein, Frame & White (2005).  
 
HYP 8: The complementarity between the two types of information is negatively 
related to the risk level of bank. 
 
The  information  used  by  the  bank  can  affect  its  total  activity.  If  the  bank  adopts  the 
combination of the two types of information, it can improve its capacity to anticipate the 
failures and consequently, ameliorate its performance.  
By deduction, one can explain the link between the bank performance and its strategy of loan 
request management: by using the two types of information, banks obtain a better visibility on 
their customers and more relevant decisions. This leads to a reduction of both credit losses 
and credit risk. This reduction contributes to a better attribution of the bank capital and the 
reduction of the reserve fixed by the directives of Basle. By respecting the legal ratios, banks 
benefit from the sinking of reserves. They can, reinvest the capital released in new credits and 
profit from their interests. This simple reasoning is, in fact, much more complicated in reality. 
It shows the close relationship between the choice of the complementarity of the two types of 
information and the improvement of banks performance. This performance can be measured 
by  several  indicators.  The  most  used  are  stock  exchange  profitability  and  accounting 
profitability. We will be interested in the latter to give an internal aspect to our study.  
Concerning this type of performance, we’ll concentrate on the return on equity, the return on 
assets, and banks credit portfolio quality. We’ll use,  as measuring instruments, the ratios 
ROE, ROA and the quality of the credit portfolio. ROE ratio was chosen by several authors 
such as Holderness & Sheehan (1988) but its disadvantage remains in the risk to give a biased 
image of profitability since a strong ratio can be the result of a low level of equities. As for 
ROA ratio, it was used by Barro & Barro (1990), Angbazo & Narayanan (1997) and Yan 
(1998). The disadvantages of this measurement are the negligence of the activities off-balance 
sheet which becomes more extensive in banking activity, and the placement of the totality of 
the assets at the same level of risk.  
 
HYP  9:  the  integration  of  “soft”  information  in  scores  improves  the  banks 
performance.  
3.  Data and variables 
 
Finding  a  relationship  between  the  choice  of  information  and  the  various  determinants, 
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the information choice, as well as the description of the decision-making process, do not exist 
in the databases. Moreover, the evaluation of the real costs of “soft” information is very 
difficult  to  realize.  Consequently,  the  research  for  all  these  data  lead  us  to  distribute  a 
questionnaire, described in the following paragraph, in addition to financial data collected 
from a database. 
 
3.1.  Data  
 
To test the assumptions above-presented we collected the data by two means: financial data 
collected in the database BANKSCOPE, concerning 17 banks which belong to our sample for 
the year 2007, and a questionnaire distributed to the bank agency managers and loan officers. 
The targeted agencies are turned towards professionals and firms. They cover all the French 
territory and their distribution is a representative panel regarding all agencies in France. We 
had well specified  in the questionnaire that the required  data should relate to  the credits 
supplied to SMEs during the year 2007 in order to combine them with the data collected from 
the database. According to the European regulation of 2003 we consider as SMEs (small or 
medium enterprises) any company that accounts less than 250 employments with a turnover 
that doesn’t exceed 50 million Euros or the balance sheet total does not exceed 43 million 
Euros.  
The final version of the questionnaire is presented in appendix 1. It was tested on under 
sample of 50 agency managers and loan officer responsible for SMEs. Several questions were 
modified  in  order  to  adapt  to  the  requirements  of  the  contacted  professionals.  The 
questionnaire was anonymous in order to respect the confidentiality right. We asked that the 
name of the bank be notified in order to complete the financial data collected in the base. The 
first part of the questionnaire is composed of six questions intended for collecting information 
on the agency (its size, the number of its employees and its geographical site). The second 
part relates to various information on the supplied and failing credits (size, the number), and 
the customer portfolio of the bank. Third rests on the decision-making process of the agency 
(the disclosure of the decision, the relationship and the nature of information). 
The description of the sample: We distributed 2134 questionnaires for 142 answers (that is to 
say  6,65%),  among  which  we  retain  105  exploitable  (5%).  These  answers  have  neither 
missing data nor incoherent information. The 17 French and foreign banks, composing the 
sample, exert on the French territory. 
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This paragraph presents all of the variables used in our study and its various measurements. 
At the end of the paragraph, a first table will summarize the various variables tested by the 
regressions and a second table will present the descriptive statistics of the qualitative variables 
concerning the decision-making process. 
 
The dependant variables of the two regressions: 
 
•  The nature of information used by the bank (INFO) is a dummy variable collected by the 
questionnaire. It takes a binary value (INFO=0 if the bank uses only “hard” information 
for the decision-making, and INFO=1 if the bank uses the two types of information). It is 
the most important variable. It enables us to distinguish between banks that choose the 
complementarities of “soft” information and “hard” information or those substitute the 
first by the second. 
•  The bank performance is measured by the adequacy between the profitability and the risk-
taking. Thus, in order to measure the bank performance, we’ll use three indicators: The 
return on assets (ROA), return on equities (ROE) and the quality of the loan portfolio 
(RIS_PF). The first two indicators of performance are used to show a possible change of 
profitability following the change of the strategy of collection, treatment and storage of 
information. And the third allows the measurement of the influence of this same change 
on the quality of the banks loans.  
The two ratios of profitability, ROA and ROE, represent respectively, a fraction of the net 
income by the total assets of the bank and by total equities. These two variables are easy 
to calculate contrary to the measurement of the credit quality which was calculated from 
the loan loss provisions. Dividing this provision by the gross value of loans gives the ratio 
quality of loan portfolio, which indicates losses related to the degradation of the credits 




•  The average credit: it is the ratio of the entire amount of total credits to the number of the 
granted credits. These data were collected from the questionnaire. 
•  The time of treatment of credit request allows us to study a possible effect of the available 
time to study a credit request on the choice of information. With the number of requests to 
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•  The length of the relationship: by this variable we tried to measure the time needed by the 
loan officer or the bank agency manager to collect sufficient “soft” information to make 
an opinion on the situation and the manager of the firm.  
•  The frequency of meetings: This variable comes to supplement the variable LENGTH. 
Indeed the length of the relationship explains the force of the relationship but it does not 
show  the  true  depth  and  the  solidity  of  this  relationship.  The  frequency  of  the 
appointments allows studying his effect on the choice of information. 
•  The centralization of the decision: the delegation of the credit supply decision can affect 
the information used for the decision making. The difference between the hierarchical 
levels of the decision-making will be presented by a dummy variable. If the decision is 
made within the agency, that will be considered as a decentralization of the decision and 
the  variable  will  take  a  value  of  0.    If  the  decision  is  made  outside  the  agency:  an 
engagement  office  or  others,  we  will  consider  that  the  bank  centralizes  the  decision-
making and we’ll give a value equal to 1 to this variable. 
•  Times of the reply: it represents the number of the days necessary to answer to loan 
application. By this variable we tried to see whether the promised time, to answer the 
requests, affects the choice of information. 
•  Treatment of a first loan application: This dummy variable is collected by questionnaire 
(FIRST_REQ=  0  if  the  agent  uses  the  same  type  of  information  for  all  the  loan 
applications, FIRST_REQ=1 if information changes the later requests). This variable tries 
to see whether the treatment of a first request differs from the treatment of another later 
and thus whether an adoption of “soft” information exists. This difference is explained by 
the effect of the experience or by the knowledge of SMEs historic, which reduces the 
effort of collection and treatment of information.  
•  Size of bank: the size of the bank is represented by the total assets. But for its use we will 
base the value given by the function Napierian logarithm.  
•  The  risk  of  the  bank:  the  measurement  of  the risk  is  indexed  on  letters  by  the  three 
agencies of ratings adopted by our study. We’ll try to allot values to the three notations of 
STANDARD & POORS, MOODY' S and FITCH. A bank having a good notation will 
have a note higher than a bank having a less good notation. The scale goes from 0 to 10. 
The three notations are very close and ordered that did not influence the average assigned 
to the banks. 
•  The time of collection, treatment and storage of information: the cost of the collection, the 
treatment and the storage of information is difficult to quantify. To measure this cost we 
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relationship with SMEs. Complementary time, on which we based to explain the cost of 
information, must be necessarily exclusive to the collection, the treatment and storage of 
the information used. This stays a try to explain the influence of the cost of information on 
the choice of the banks through the time necessaries for the loan officer. 
•  Default probability: this variable is calculated on the basis of notation of STANDARD & 




Banks have recourse to private information which is different from that used by the other 
financial  institutions  and  which  is  based  on  a  personal  interpretation  of  the  loan  officer 
concerning the situation of the SMEs. A relational method to obtain “soft” information missed 
in the financial documents is better adapted but more difficult to standardize. Specificities of 
SMEs require a particular treatment by their banks and specificities of banks influence their 
work methods. For this reason we tried to integrate some variables of control which permit us 
to see their effect on the various results. 
We were interested in three criteria: nationality, membership of a group and the nature of 
shareholding. 
The nationality of the bank can affect the choice of the information used for the decision 
making. The relationship of SMEs with the foreign banks is particularly fragile. These banks 
do not prefer to use “soft” information; they maintain businesses with the largest, oldest and 
most transparent companies. This choice is strategic so that these banks make the most of 
“hard” information (Berger & Al 2008). They can be penalized by the cultural and linguistic 
differences during the collect of “soft” information (Berger & Udell 2002). This idea was 
confirmed by Berger & Al (2008) by supporting that firms which have relationships with the 
foreign banks have the will to establish several relationships.  
The membership of a group can affect banks behaviour. A small bank which belongs to a 
“holding” can behave like a large bank (Keeton 1995, Berger & Al 2001 and Carter & Mc 
Nulty 2005). A small bank which uses “soft” information can have to use “hard” information 
in order to align itself to the information system of the group. 
The last distinction is made between commercial and mutual banks. The activity of these last 
is based on a particular ideology. Thus their work method and their standard of the established 
relationship  are  different  from  the  commercial banks.  The  particularity  of  the  customers-
shareholders in the mutual banks requires more developed information. 
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•  The nature of the shareholding: the structure of shareholding of a bank will be presented 
by variable BK_MUT. This variable takes binary value. It is equal to 1 if the bank is 
mutual, 0 if not. 
•  Membership of group: a dummy variable will indicate weather the bank belongs to a 
group or not. If the bank belongs to a group, this variable (BK_GRP) will take value 1, 
and if it is independent the variable will be equal to 0. 
•  The nationality of the bank: a dummy variable allowing to distinguish between the French 
and foreign banks which exert in France. This variable has a binary value (BK_NAT =1 if 




This table presents the various variables taken into account in our regressions. The second 
column encodes the results of the realized tests. The mention “accounts annual” indicates that 
the variables are calculated from the collected data of income statement of the bank, and the 
mention “credit rating agency” makes reference to the agencies of STANDARD ratings & 
POORS, FITCH and MOODY' S. 
 
The variable  The code  The source 
Used Information  INFO  Questionnaire 
Return on assets   ROA  Annual accounts 
Return on equity  ROE  Annual accounts 
The quality of the portfolio credit  QLTE_PF  Annual accounts 
The average size of credits  AVR_CR   Questionnaire 
Treatment time of an loan application  TIME_TR  Questionnaire 
Length of the relationship with a borrower  LENGTH  Questionnaire 
The frequency of the FRQ_MEETING  FRQ_MEETINGQuestionnaire 
The hierarchical level of the decision-making  HIER   Questionnaire 
The deadline for reply  REPLY  Questionnaire 
Treatment of a first request   FIRST_REQ  Questionnaire 
The size (Log of the assets)  ASSETS  Questionnaire 
The index of the bank risk  RISK  Credit rating agency 
Costs in term of time of the collection, of  
treatment and of the storage of used information  COST     Questionnaire 
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The nationality of the bank  BK_NAT  Annual accounts 
The nature of property (mutual banks, commercial banks)  BK_MUT  Questionnaire 




Table 2 presents descriptive statistics of our qualitative variables. The entire answers rise 
from the questionnaire distributed to the agency managers and loan officers in charge of the 
credits of SMEs. 
The first panel shows the various rates of use of each type of information for the decision-
making, for short-term credits or long-term. The second panel gives us the participation of the 
various variables in the delegation of the credit decisions. The third one has the rates of the 




  Short Term Credit     Long Term credit 
Financial analysis  103 (98,10%)  105 (100%) 
Cash analysis  94 (89,52%)  84 (80%) 
Current accounts  62 (59,05%)  77 (73,33%) 
An appointment  96 (91,43%)  88 (83,81%) 
A judgment of loan officer   53 (50,48%)  66 (62,86%) 
Competences of the manager (CV)  68 (64,76%)  79 (75,24%) 
The history of the credits  48 (45,71%)  65 (61,9%) 
A report of the French Central Bank  33 (31,43%)  57 (54,29%) 
A report of another bank which exerts with 
the same firm but before your Bank  6 (5,71%)  11 (10,48%) 
 
Variables of the delegation of the decision 
 
Global economic conjuncture  37 (35,24%) 
Risk of the business line of SMEs  56 (53,33%) 
Quality of financial data  86 (81,9%) 
Size of the SMEs  31 (29,52%) 
Finality of the credit  45 (42,86%) 
Risk of the SMEs    80 (76,19%) 
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Variables of the influence of the decision 
 
The strength of the relationship with SMEs  84 (80%) 
A judgment of the future situation of SMEs  78 (74,29%) 
Future projects of the borrower  60 (54,14%) 
Competences of the manager  91 (86,67%) 
Your “feeling”  47 (44,76%) 
The estimate of the guarantees value   67 (63,81%) 
An extra-professional relationship  17 (16,19%) 
4.  Regressions 
 
4.1.  Methodology 
 
Our work consists on three parts. The first part relates to a logistic regression of the variable 
information (INFO) to determine the significativity of the various determinants taken into 
account  in  the  regression.  In  the  second  part,  we’ll  study  the  effect  of  the  choice  of 
information on the bank performance and the third part presents a statistical description of the 
integration of the various qualitative variables in the decision-making process. 
 
Since the dependant variable of our first regression is a dummy variable, the use of a logistic 
model of regression seems more adequate for our study. The choice between the model Probit 
and Logit is not very important. In our sample, we have observed that the phenomenon at 
which we attributed the binary value 1 is more frequent which is why we used the Logit 
model. 
 





   
 
In the second part, we’ll try to explain profitability and the loss provisions of bank by the 
adopted choice of information. To do so, we used regressions of ordinary least squares (OLS). 
We carried out this second regression in two stages. In the first stage, we integrated only one 
independent variable: INFO. In the second stage, we integrated other variables of control to 
eliminate biases related to specificities from the bank. The adopted variables relate to three 
characteristics  of the  bank:  its membership of group, its  nationality and the nature of its 
shareholding. (BK_GRP, BK_NAT and BK_MUT). 
Ln [                      ] = 
a0  + a1 FIRST_REQ +  a2 LENGTH +  a3 FRQ_MEETING +  
a4  TIME_TR  + a5 REPLY + a6 AVR_CR  + a7 ASSETS + a8 
HIER +  a9 COST + a10 RISK + a11 DP + ￿ 
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First stage  Second stage 
ROA=b0+b1INFO +e  ROA= b0+ b1INFO + b2BK_GRP + b3BK_NAT + b4BK_MUT + e 
ROE=g0+g1INFO+e  ROE= g0 + g1INFO + g2BK_GRP + g3BK_NAT + g4BK_MUT + e 
RIS_PF=l0+l1INFO+e  RIS_PF= l0+ l1INFO + l2BK_GRP + l3BK_NAT + l4BK_MUT +e 
 
The third part of our study presents a statistical description of the various variables that could 
influence the decision-making process of the bank. 
 
4.2.  Results and discussions 
 
Results of our first regression are presented in table 1.The Pseudo-R² of McFadden had a 
value  equalizes  to  0,239.  We  found  statistical  significativity  for  five  among  the  eight 
assumptions studied by this first regression. 
The not validated assumption is the sixth. Indeed, according to the results of the regressions, 
we can conclude that the hierarchical level of the loan decision-making does not influence the 
choice of information. 
The assumptions about which one cannot come to a conclusion are the third and the eighth. 
Concerning, the third assumption which is supporting the idea that the constraint of time 
supports  the  substitution  of  “hard”  information  to  “soft”  information,  it  is  tested  by  two 
variables: REPLY which represents the times required to answer the loan application and the 
variable TIME_TR which indicates time estimated to treat a request. We cannot come to a 
conclusion about the validity of this assumption because the variable REPLY did not have a 
statistical significativity, in spite of the positive sign allotted to this variable confirming that a 
longer time gives the possibility to use the two types of information, thus confirming our 
proposal.  The  other  variable  TIME_TR,  which  is  statistically  significant,  had  a  minus 
coefficient, in accordance with our expectations. This result can be explained by the fact that a 
longer processing time allows loan officer analyzing well “hard” information. It takes the time 
necessary to analyze all the financial information at its disposal, in order to take the good 
decision. A short time of treatment obliges the loan officer to reduce the “hard” information 
retrieval and to support the use of “soft” information which is already collected. He will 
combine the two types of information to decide. 
It is difficult to decide concerning the validity of the last assumption which makes it possible 
to measure the effect of risk on the choice of adopted information. The measurement of risk 
was  studied  by  integration  in  the  model  of  two  variables:  the  risk  of  bank  (RISK)  and 








































1  25 
negatively correlated with the complementarity of the two types of information. This first 
result, in spite of its non-significativity, enables us to say that the fall of the probability of 
default pushes the banks to adopt “hard” information which seems to be more exact and more 
rigid. The variable RISK is significant and is negatively correlated with the adoption of the 
only  “hard”  information.  This  fact  confirms  the  assumption  that  the  use  of  the 
complementarity between the two types of information is negatively related to the risk of the 
bank. The integration of “soft” information contributes to the improvement of the quality of 
information and thus it minimizes the catch of the false decisions. 
 
All remaining assumptions are validated. Indeed, we note that the sign of the coefficient of 
variable FIRST_REQ is positive, which explains why the officer charged with SMEs do not 
use  the  same  type  of  information  for  all  credit  applications.  They  tend  to  use  “soft” 
information in addition to “hard” information for the later requests. This confirms our first 
assumption according to which the information used at the time of the first request, and which 
can be only “hard”, is different from that used later on.  
The second assumption is tested by two variables: the length of the relationship (LENGTH) 
and  the  frequency  of  appointment  (FRQ_MEETING),  necessary  for  the  loan  officer  for 
SMEs,  in  the  collection  of  “soft”  information  and  the  acquisition  of  an  opinion  on  the 
situation of the firm. These two variables must measure the force of the relationship. They 
had T of Student significant but opposite signs of the coefficients. The sign of the frequency 
of the FRQ_MEETING is positive, which can be explained by the fact that the number of the 
appointment supports the collection of “soft” information and the construction of an image 
which reflects the real situation of SMEs. Contrariwise, the LENGTH of the relationship 
(LENGTH) admits a minus coefficient, which is explained by the fact that one very long 
period for the collection of “soft” information can harm its reliability. The longer the period 
of collection is, the less  it reflects the real situation of the firm.  Our  assumption is  thus 
validated and confirms that the contact supports the collection of “soft” information. 
The regression carried out shows us that, in accordance with the statements of the fourth 
assumption, the average amount of credits is negatively correlated with the complementarity 
of the two types of information. Indeed, variable AVR_CR had a coefficient close to -0,20. 
The  increase  in  the  intermediate  size  of  the  credits  leads  to  the  use  of  the  only  “hard” 
information and thus eliminates any assessment or personal judgment. We can explain this 
result by the fact that, in the case of an important credit, banks try to be more protected 
against  a  possible  failure.  Thus  they  try  to  minimize  the  margins  of  interpretation  and 
judgment and to choose financial information which is reliable and easy to control. Banks 
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Still  in  the  negative  correlations,  the  bank  size,  represented  by  the  variable  ASSETS,  is 
negatively related to the combination of the two types of information. This report confirms 
the fifth advanced assumption and supporting the idea that large banks approve the use of the 
only “hard” information, and thus confirms all the theories which predicted that the big size of 
the  bank  is  an  important  variable  for  the  generalization  of  the  quantitative  models  of 
evaluation. 
Moreover, seventh assumption, which predicts that the cost of the collection, of treatment and 
of storage of information can affect the choice of the type of information used, is validated. 
As a matter of fact, the variable COST, measured by the time necessary for the information 
collection,  treatment  and  storage,  was  negatively  correlated  with  the  use  of  “hard” 
information  alone.  In  other  words,  the  fall  of  the  information  cost,  used  for  the  request 
handling,  can  explain  the  substitution  of  “soft”  information  by  “hard”  information.  This 
variable can be shown similar to the variable LENGTH, but in reality it does not represent the 
same measurement of time. One measure the time necessary to judge the situation of SMEs 
and the other evaluate the time necessary to collect, treat and store the useful information in 
the decision-making. 
In order to test the robustness of our model, we carried out the test of collinearity which 
measures the factors of inflation of variance. This test showed the absence of collinearity 
between our independent variables. It is important to note that all of the securities of the test 
do  not  exceed  3  whereas  the  maximum  value  to  accept  the  assumption  of  absence  of 
collinearity is valued at 10. 
 
Our second part was carried out into two steps. The results of the first three regressions are 
presented in table 2 in the appendix. They show a statistical significativity, with 1% of error, 
of the influence of the nature of information on the return on equity and the quality of the 
wallet credit. Indeed, with T of Student having respective values of 3,206 and of - 2,668, we 
can conclude the significativity of the variable INFO. The positive coefficient of the variable 
INFO in the regression performed on the ROE shows that the choice of the complementarity 
of information  influences positively this  profitability.  Moreover, the variable  INFOR was 
affected negatively with variable QLTE_PF. A low value of this ratio can be interpreted as a 
good quality of the wallet credit. Thus the negative sign, between the complementarity of the 
two information and this variable shows a good influence of the complementarity on the 
quality of the credits. However, the significativity of this variable in explaining the economic 
profitability of the bank is verified to only 10% of error. This suggests that the level equities 
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We carried out a second regression by taking in account three variables which we think are 
capable to influence the bank performance: its nationality, its membership of group and the 
nature of its shareholding. The results of this second regression (table 3 of the appendix) 
confirm those of the first. Indeed, the significativity and the sign of the variable INFO remain 
unchanged for the three variables which measure the performance. What minimizes biases 
related to the membership of the bank to a group and the nature of its shareholding. 
 
At the time of the two steps, we carried out tests on the robustness of the model and we 
confirmed the null assumption of absence of heteroscedasticity in the six regressions realized 
and  the  assumption  of  absence  of  collinearity  between  the  explanatory  variables  for  the 
regressions of the second phase. 
 
The third part of our empirical study will relate to a statistical description of the decision-
making process of the agents of credit. 
The first under part will show the various information sources used for the decision-making. 
We note that almost all the loan officers use the financial data for the study of the short-term 
and long-term loan applications. But the “soft” information sources are used, for the credits 
with Long Term, that for those with Short Term except for the FRQ_MEETING (91% for the 
ST  compared  with  83%  for  the  LT).  The  most  outstanding  fact  of  this  part  remains  the 
percentage of loan officers which uses their personal judgments as information source (50% 
for the ST and 66% for the LT). The other point which needs to be underlined is the weak 
coordination between banks. Only 5,71% for the ST and 10,5% for the LT, of bankers who 
respond to our questions use  report  of other banks working  with the same customer and 
having an older relationship. However, the report of the bank of France is used by 55% of 
these respondent for a LT credit but only 31% for the ST. 
A test of differences of means was carried out in order to look for a significant difference 
between the information sources used during the treatment of the long-term credits and the 
short-term credits. After having tested the difference of the variances and obtaining a result 
confirming the absence of a statistically significant difference, we realized the test of the 
difference of the means under the assumption of equality of the variances. We could not reject 
the null assumption thus confirming an equality of the means. We deduce from it that there 
exists a similarity of treatment of the short-term and long-term credits (Table 4). 
The second part of this descriptive analysis will allow us to present the various variables of 
delegation  of  decision  making.  The  two  more  important  variables,  according  to  the 
respondents, are the quality of the financial data for 82% of the cases and the risk of the 
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decision-making, but in  a less  important  scale than the two previous. Nearly 70% of the 
respondents confirm that the level of the decision-making depends on the amount of credit. 
But the most important fact is that the characteristics of the borrowers, such as the size of 
SMEs and the finality of the credits intervene in the decision of delegation, with respective 
percentages of use of 29,5% and 42%. With regard to the total economic conjuncture, it 
intervenes only in 35% of the cases, which shows the bad adaptation of the decision-making 
processes to the environmental changes. This organizational rigidity enables us to wonder 
about the procedural flexibility of the bank. If a bank doesn’t adapt its management to the 
requirements of the market, it will be found in difficulty to optimize its activity and to exploit 
its assets. 
The  third under part will show  the  various variables which  influence the decision  of the 
granting of credit and the importance of “soft” information in this decision. 
As  opposed  to  our  expectations,  the  variable  that  most  influences  the  decision,  remains 
“competences of manager”, with a very high utilization ratio. Indeed 86% of loan officers 
specify that they were affected by competences of the manager at the time of the decision-
making.  
 
The  strength  of  the  relationship  is  less  important  according  to  the  respondents  but  its 
utilization ratio remains nevertheless high, 80% of the latter confirmed to have changed the 
decision  into  being  based  on  the  strength  of  their  relationship  with  SMEs.  Personal 
interpretation, of the loan officer remains important in the sources of the information used for 
the  credit  supplying  decision-making,  with  a  percentage  of  use  close  to  45%.  The  most 
outstanding point, of this table, remains the weight of the professional extra relationships in 
the judgment of the banker. Indeed, in more than one case out of six, loan officers for SMEs 
and the agency managers are based on professional extra relationships to influence or make 
influence the decision of credit. However, the judgment of the future situation of SMEs, the 
assessment  of  the  guarantees  and  the  future  projects  of  the  borrower,  which  are  having 
respective frequencies of uses of 75%, 64% and 54%, are shown under exploited by taking 
account of their importance in the justification of the taken risk level. 
The conclusion to be drawn from this paragraph is that the use of “soft” information in the 
credit granting decision is very widespread. It remains to find the means of optimizing its 
exploitation. This information is difficult to quantify, but regarding its importance, it was 
necessary to find a solution to formally control it and integrate it in the calculation of the 
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5.  Conclusion 
 
In  an  unfavourable  international  economic  conjuncture,  banks  must  face  an  increasing 
difficulty of credit supply. They must optimize the allowance of their assets, during one time 
characterized by an outstanding absence of financial credibility. In spite of the fact that SMEs 
represent the most important components of French economic fabric, they suffer from a great 
vulnerability related to their opacity. The financial information alone can’t allow this category 
of firm to take profit from the credits.  
“Soft” information which is collected throughout the relationship, connecting the banks and 
SMEs, seems necessary to reduce the problem of informational asymmetry. The committee of 
Basle incites banks to use more specific internal scores for the evaluation of their customers, 
but these scores compromise the advantages related to the “soft” information treatment. 
Our work proved the statistical significativity of eight variables, among eleven suggested, to 
explain the choice of the complementarity or substitution between the used information. This 
significativity  made it  possible to validate five assumptions, to invalidate  one and not to 
decide  concerning  two  others.  These  first  studies  showed  that  the  choice  of  information 
affects the quality of the informational inputs of the credit decision.  
We  tried  in  the  second  part  of  this  work  to  find  a  relationship  between  this  choice  of 
information  and  the  banking  performance,  but  we  could  not  validate  the  assumption 
supporting  the  idea  that  the  complementarity  of  information  used  improves  the  banking 
performance. Contrary and concerning risks we could observe a negative relationship between 
the  complementarity  of  the  two  types  of  information  and  the  quality  of  the  bank  credit 
portfolio and this can be explained by the fact that “soft” information is merely subjective. 
On the practical level, in spite of the weak relationship between the performance of the bank 
and the exploitation of “soft” information, the loan officer responsible for SMEs essentially 
uses this type of information to slice in the credit decision. 
Regarding responses gave by bankers, we can conclude about the importance of the use of 
this information in the decision-making. This information is probably important for making 
the best decision and the minimization of the taken bank risk, but it remains to standardize it 
and integrate it in the notations and the scores attributed to SMEs. This standardization is 
difficult to realize and opens the horizon with a new control system of the treatment of the 
loan  applications.  The  difference  between  the  imposed  rules  and  the  practice  will  grow 
blurred  to  leave  the  place  with  a  blind  application  of  the  mathematical  models  and  the 
calculation of the financial scores what will push banks to make arbitration between risks 
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7.  Appendices 
 
 
Appendix 1: The questionnaire 
 
General information on the agency 
We  will  begin  our  questionnaire  with  the  general  collection  of  information 
concerning the agency which you supervise. The required data must relate to the year 
2008. Some questions only are concerned with this precision. 
 
1.  With which banking network belongs the agency which you manage? 
2.  Can you give us the full number of the people who work within your agency and the 
number of loan officers responsible for SMEs? 
 
The full number    




3.  How much you think the amount of personnel expenses for this agency? 
4.  How much is the total operating expenses of the agency? 
5.  Can you specify the size of the city in which you exert your work? 
 




+  of  200000 
residents 
Between 
200000  and 
50000 residents 
-  of  50000 
residents 
countryside 
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Information on the credits 
 
In this second part of the questionnaire, we will pass to information concerning the credits 
and the client portfolio of the branch. I remind to you that the data sought target loans to 
SMEs during the year 2008. 
 
7.  How much you think the total amount of the credits supplied by your agency? 
8.  Can you give us the number of credits granted by the agency? 
9.  Can you communicate the rejection rate of loan applications treated by your agency? (the 
number of negative responses to the granting of credit after a request study)  
10. What was the total value of the SMEs loans default? (the default credits are those which 
present a default payment of 90 days or more) 
11. What is the full number of credits considered failures during 2008? 
12. Can you specify us if there exists a system of internal rate of transfer? 
YES                NOT                
13. If YES, can you give us the cost of refinancing paid by the agency to be able to supply 
the credits SMEs?  
14. Can you tell us how is established the refinancing rate? 
15. Can you estimate the number of hours necessary for loan officer responsible for SMEs to 













17. From how long established relationship allows you to build a sufficient personal idea to 
judge the SMEs manager without recourse to the updated financial data? 
  Short-term credit  Long-term credit 
Less than 10.000€     
Between  10.000€  and 
100.000€ 
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18. After  how many  appointments  you  can  build a  sufficient  personal  idea  to judge  the 
SMEs manager without recourse to the updated financial data? 
19. Can you estimate the customer portfolio risk of your agency (Tick the box which appears 
representative to you)? 
 
General information on the credit decision-making 
 
Now, we will approach the various elements which influence the credit decision making. 
For the multiple choice questions, please tick the answer which appears good to you. 
 
20. According to your processes, can you give us the origins of the used information during 
the treatment of a loan application of short term and long term credits  (to tick the boxes 
which seems to you adequate) 
  Short-term credit  Long-term credit 
Financial analysis     
Cash analysis     
Current accounts     
An appointment     
A judgment of loan officer     
Competences of the manager (CV)     
The history of the credits     
A report of the French Central Bank     
Of  another  bank  which  exerts  with 
the same firm but before your bank 
   
 
21. Can you tell us if you treat the information in the same way for a first loan application 
and subsequent requests? 
YES                                     NOT         
22. Can  you  assess  the  additional  time  to  time  normally  devoted  to  the  follow-up  of  a 
relationship with SMEs and necessary to the collect, the treatment and the storage  of 
used information to respond to a credit request? 
Very risky  Risky  Moderately 
risky 
low risky  Slightly 
risky 
No risky  
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23. Can you give us the number of days taken to respond to a credit application? 
24. Is the decision of credit taken within the agency or commitment management? 
The agency (Credit management)                                  
Commitment management (Risk management)   
25. Can you specify what variables may depend on the delegation on the credit decision? 
(you can tick several alternatives) 
 
The global economic conjuncture   
Risk of the business line of SMEs   
Quality of the financial data   
Size of the SMEs   
The finality of the credit   
Risk of the SMEs   
Size of credit   
 
26. If the amount of credit affects the delegation of the credit decision, from which amount 
this decision is delegated to an external person at the agency? 
27. According to you, can the length of service of loan officer influence the choice of used 
information? 
YES                     NOT    
28. To evaluate SMEs in a loan application, you use internal scores (calculated within the 
bank) or external scores (transmitted by the French Central Bank or others…)? 
Internal score    
External score   
 
29. Take you into consideration non financial factors, in addition to the scores to decide of 
the request of the credit? 
YES                    NOT    
30. If the score of SMEs is lower but not far from the threshold of acceptance. Can you 
influence the response to the loan application? 
YES                    NOT    
31. On  which elements you can rely to influence a  decision  of credit? (you can choose 
several alternatives) 












































A judgment of the future situation of SMEs   
Future projects of the borrower   
Competences of the manager   
Your “feeling”   
The estimate of the guarantees value    




Logit estimate using the 105 observations 1-105 
Dependant variable: INFO 
 
 
Mean of INFO = 0,724 
Number of cases “correctly predicted” = 83 (79,0%) 
F (beta' X) at the mean of the independent variables = 0,149 
McFadden’s Pseudo-R-squared = 0,239334 
Log-likelihood = -44,0691 
Likelihood ratio test: Chi-square (11) = 34,6189 (p. value 0,001181) 
Akaike information Criterion (AIC) = 116,138 
Schwarz Bayesien criterion (BIC) = 149,986 







Variable  Coefficient  Std error  Statistics T 
Const  33,154  12,1919  2,7193 
FIRST_REQ  0,994177  0,680743  2,4604 
LENGTH  -0,46225  0,243964  -2,0948 
FRQ_MEETING  0,392153  0,163624  2,3967 
TIME_TR  -0,535651  0,27209  -1,9687 
REPLY  0,200834  0,108864  1,8448 
AVR_CR  -0,195587  0,171781  -2,1386 
ASSETS  -0,765  0,253779  -3,0144 
HIER  0,0222  0,637877  0,0348 
COST  -0,540227  0,217048  -2,4890 
RISK  -2,67108  1,37686  -1,9800 
DP  -0,174433  1,9415  0,0898 
  Predicted 
  0  1 
0  15  14  Current 
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Test of collinearity: 
 
Variance Inflation Factors  
VIF (J) = 1/(1 - R(J)^2), where R(J) is the multiple correlation coefficient between the 
independent variable J and the other variables 
 Possible minimal value = 1.0 
 Value > 10.0 can indicate a multi collinearity problem  
 




OLS estimates using the 105 observations 1-105 
 
  ROA  ROE  QLTE_PF 












R squared  0,0297747  0,0907459  0,0646617 
Adjusted R-squared   0,020355  0,0819182  0,0555807 
Test of White  TR²  =  0,651999<     
χ²(1) = 3,84 
TR²  =  2,55331< 
χ²(1) = 3,84 
TR² = 0,000385651< 
χ²(1) = 3,84 




OLS estimates using the 105 observations 1-105 
 
  ROA  ROE  QLTE_PF 






























R-squared  0,0525  0,283161  0,150708 
adjusted R-squared   0,0146  0,254487  0,116737 
Test of White for the 
heteroscedasticity 
null  Assumption: 
absence  of 
heteroscedasticity  
TR² = 5,06964 
 with  p.  value  =  P 
(Chi-square  (9)  > 
5,06964) = 0,828195 
 
TR² = 11,6408 
 with  p.  value  =  P 
(Chi-square  (9)  > 
11,6408) = 0,234327 
 
TR² = 15,4554 
 with  p.  value  =  P 
(Chi-square  (9)  > 
15,4554) = 0,079163 
Test of collinearity of 
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TABLE 4: test of means difference  
 
1st step: test of variance difference: 
 
Test of equality of the variances (F-Test) 






Mean  62,5555556  70,2222222 
Variance  1018,52778  695,694444 
Observations  9  9 
Degree of freedom  8  8 
f  1,46404472   
P (F<=f) one tail  0,30116936   
P. value for F one tail  3,43810123    
 
F (1,464) <f one tail (3,438) 
 
2nd stage: test of mean difference with equal variance 
 
Test  of  the  expected  value  equality:  two  observations  of  equal 
variances 






Mean  62,5555556  70,2222222 
Variance  1018,52778  695,694444 
Observations  9  9 
Pooled variance  857,111111   
Hypothesized Mean Difference  0   
Degree of freedom  16   
Statistics t  -0,55551306   
P (T<=t) one tail  0,293114   
T Critical one tail  1,74588367   
P (T<=t) two tail  0,586228   
T Critical two tail  2,11990529    
 
T one tail (0, 2931) < t critical one tail (1,745) 
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